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ABSTRACT
Consumers often benefit from increased competition in differentiated product settings. In this paper
we consider consumer benefits from increased competition in a differentiated product setting: the
spread of non-traditional retail outlets. In this paper we estimate consumer benefits from supercenter
entry and expansion into markets for food. We estimate a discrete choice model for household
shopping choice of supercenters and traditional outlets for food. We have panel data for households
so we can follow their shopping patterns over time and allow for a fixed effect in their shopping
behavior. We find the benefits to be substantial, both in terms of food expenditure and in terms of
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I.   Introduction 
Consumers often benefit from increased competition in differentiated product 
settings.  In previous research Hausman (1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2002) has estimated the 
increased consumer welfare from the introduction of new brand, e.g. Apple Cinnamon 
Cheerios, and new products, e.g. mobile telephones.  In this paper we consider consumer 
benefits from increased competition in a differentiated product setting: the spread of non-
traditional retail outlets.  Non-traditional outlets, including supercenters, warehouse club 
stores, and mass merchandisers have grown in popularity and nearly doubled their share 
of consumer food-at-home expenditures from 1998 to 2003
3.  Within this non-traditional 
retail group, supercenters have experienced the largest increase over this time period, but 
warehouse club stores and dollar stores have also experienced significant increases in 
their share of the consumer food dollar as U.S. consumers attempt to find the best 
combination of prices and services at their retailer of choice.   
Supercenters are extremely large stores that sell a wide variety of products.  They 
are differentiated from more traditional shopping outlets that often specialize in a specific 
category: supermarkets specialize in selling food, although they carry other products, 
while a supercenter will sell food, clothing, prescription drugs, clothing, home office 
supplies, and electronic equipment. 
These supercenters are new outlets within a given geographic market defined by 
household shopping patterns.  They originally began in the southern and southwestern 
areas of the US.
4  Over the past few years they have spread to the central U.S. and they 
                                                 
1  Presented at EC
2 conference, December 2004.  J. van Biesebroeck and S. Berry provided helpful comments.  We 
thank Jie Yang,  Ketan Patel, Amy Brown, and Leah Graham Reid for research assistance.  Author contact: 
jhausman@mit.edu 
2 Revised draft: do not quote or cite without permission.  No views in this paper reflect the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture’s position on these issues. 
3 USDA calculations using ACNielsen Homescan data. 
4 Somewhat similar outlets, called hypermarkets in France, have existed for a number of years.   2
are now attempting to move into the northeast and west coast areas of the U.S.  However, 
they have encountered problems in entering markets in these areas, with the restrictions 
often created by zoning ordinances. 
By far the largest and most controversial of these supercenter outlets is Wal-Mart.  
Wal-Mart typically encounters significant opposition from competing outlets and from 
labor unions, who often represent workers in these competing outlets.
5  Wal-Mart charges 
significantly lower prices than traditional outlets.  The traditional outlets typically 
respond to Wal-Mart entry by decreasing their prices and attempting to reduce wages and 
benefits to their unionized workforce.  Thus, neither competitive outlets nor their 
unionized workforces favor Wal-Mart entry.  Indeed, from late 2003 to early 2004, a 
protracted work stoppage took place in Los Angeles area supermarkets prior to expected 
Wal-Mart entry into the market. 
In this paper we estimate consumer benefits from supercenter entry and expansion 
into markets for food.  We estimate a discrete choice model for household shopping 
choice of supercenters and traditional outlets for food. We have panel data for households 
so we can follow their shopping patterns over time and allow for a fixed effect in their 
shopping behavior.  Most households shop at both supercenters and traditional outlets 
during the period.  Given a model of shopping behavior we estimate the compensating 
variation of household from the presence of supercenters.  We find the benefits to be 
substantial.  Thus, while we do not estimate the costs to workers who may receive lower 
wages and benefits, we find the effects of supercenter entry and expansion to be 
sufficiently large so that overall we find it to be extremely unlikely that the expansion of 
supercenters does not confer a significant overall benefit to consumers. 
 
II. Market Description 
Over the past decade, non-traditional shopping formats have captured significant 
share from traditional grocery stores and conventional supermarkets.  P. Little (2004) 
describes the two categories of alternative retail outlets as “high-spend” outlets, which are 
low price, one-stop shopping destinations, and “low and medium-spend” stores which are 
                                                 
5 Wal-Mart has no unions in the US.  It has recently permitted unions in China.  A Wal-Mart store in Quebec, 
Canada has been involved in a controversy over whether its workers will form a union.   3
mostly convenience stores that serve a “fill-in” role in between trips to the “high-spend” 
outlets  He includes supercenters (Wal-Mart, Kmart, Meijer, etc.), warehouse clubs 
(Sam’s Club, Costco and BJ’s), and mass merchants (Wal-Mart, Kmart, Target, etc.) as 
the primary outlets for these “high-spend” expenditures.
 6 Using 2003 data, he estimates 
that these outlets have 24.8% of food expenditures, with supercenters having 45.6% of the 
category.  Over the past few years Wal-Mart has become the largest supermarket chain in 
the U.S.  Wal-Mart, excluding its Sam’s Club, now has supermarket- related revenues 
approximately 51% larger than the runner-up Kroger, and larger than Albertsons and 
Safeway, the third and fourth largest supermarket chains, combined.  Nationwide Wal-
Mart has a 14% market share (in 2003), despite not being in a number of regional 
markets, and an 18% share when Sam’s Clubs are included. Within the “medium-low 
spend” category, Little estimates convenience stores that also sell gasoline as the fastest 
growing store type with 85.5% of the 12.4% total share for the category. Little calculates 
that total traditional grocery outlets, including conventional supermarkets and superstores 
(a larger version of the conventional supermarket), have decreased to a 56.3% dollar share 
in 2003.  He also forecasts that in 5 years, the “high-spend category” will grow from 
24.8% to 31%, with supercenters comprising 54.8% of the total while traditional grocery 
outlets decrease from 56.3% to 48.3%.  Thus, he expects Wal-Mart to become 
increasingly important over the next few years, continuing the trend of change over the 
past decade. 
Wal-Mart began selling food in 1988 and in 2002 became the largest grocery chain 
in the U.S, now larger than Kroger, Albertsons, and Safeway, which are the next largest 
supermarket chains.  Significant consolidation has occurred in the supermarket industry, 
but Wal-Mart continues to grow at a significantly faster rate than these supermarket 
chains.  The majority of Wal-Mart’s grocery sales arise from its over 1400 (as of April 
2004) supercenters which average 180,000 square feet per store and contain both discount 
and grocery store items, although it also has some “Neighborhood Market” stores that are 
about the size (40,000 sq. feet) of an average supermarket.
4  While most of the stores are 
                                                 
6 Sam’s Club is owned by Wal-Mart. 
4 Wal-Mart management has given guidance that it expects to open between 230-240 new supercenters in 2005 for 
an increase of about 16%.  See Dow Jones, “Factiva,” April 19, 2004.  Morgan Stanley reports that Wal-Mart is 
seeking 16%-17% growth in supermarket sales compared with 3% industry growth.  See M. Wiltamuth and R.   4
in the South and Southwest, Wal-Mart is increasingly moving into urban centers with 
openings expected in Los Angeles and Chicago, along with other urban areas.
7  
One possible explanation for the increases in food sales from non-traditional 
outlets can be seen in a comparison of CPI and PPI numbers for these food categories.   
Over the 10-year period from 1991-2001 margins increased in supermarkets as the price 
of food sold at supermarkets grew at approximately twice the rate of the PPI for food.  
Over this period the PPI for finished food increased by 13.9% while the CPI for food at 
home increased by 27.7% as demonstrated in Figure 1. 
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CPI food at home PPI finished food
   Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov) 
 
The CPI for food at home is the portion of the consumer price index that measures price 
change for food items primarily consumed at home most of which is purchased at 
                                                                                                                                                             
Fariborz, “Food Retail,” June 2004.  Wal-Mart has grown at a 16% rate over the past three years.   
7 Wal-Mart has sometimes had difficulty in receiving planning approval for its stores.  Currently, Wal-Mart has 
either no presence or an extremely limited presence in New England, the New York metro area, California, and the 
Pacific Northwest.  However, its expansion into new areas has proceeded over the past few years.   5
supermarkets.
8  The PPI for finished food products is the portion of the producer price 
index which approximates wholesale prices for the majority of supermarket food sales. 
While other cost components, e.g. labor costs, enter the cost function of supermarkets, 
wage and other inflation was sufficiently lower during the 1991-2001 period that it is very 
likely that gross margins (price minus average variable cost) increased significantly 
during the 1990s.  Indeed, the operating profit margins of the large supermarket chains 
demonstrate that gross margins increased.   
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Note:  Source: SEC 10-K filings.  Safeway Operating Profit is defined as Sales less Operating and Administrative Expenses.  Kroger Operating 
Profit is defined as Sales less Costs and Expenses, excluding Net Interest Expense.  The strike in Southern California also contributed to the 
decline in Safeway's Operating Profit in 2003 and 2004.  
 
 
Over the period from 1991 to 2001 Kroger’s operating profit margin increased from 
3.3% to 4.7%.  Over the same period Safeway’s profit margin increased from 3.6% to 
7.9%.  This increased gross margin presented supercenters, and especially Wal-Mart, an 
invitation to enter markets and to expand with their lower than supermarket prices.  
                                                 
8 Because of an incorrect “linking procedure” used by the BLS in computing the CPI, the prices from Wal-Mart and 
other supercenters do not affect the CPI when these stores enter new market or expand in existing markets.  For a 
discussion see Hausman (2003), and Hausman and Leibtag (2004).   6
Despite significant recent research on competition among supermarkets, the importance 
of this factor does not seem to have been recognized. 
Various studies have demonstrated that food prices at Wal-Mart are 8%-27% 
lower than at the large supermarket chains, even after discounts for loyalty card and other 
specials are taken into account.
9  After entry by Wal-Mart, conventional supermarkets 
typically decrease their prices (or do not increase them as much as in non-Wal-Mart 
markets) because of the increased competition.  Basker (2004) explored the decreased 
prices in a market with Wal-Mart present for drug stores, convenience stores, and clothing 
stores, but did not discuss the dynamics of entry and expansion nor the consumer benefits 
from these market outcomes.  
Some previous studies and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics have posited a 
“compensating service effect” explanation whereby consumers do not receive benefits 
because of inferior service from supercenters.  However, this explanation is inconsistent 
with the “indirect price effect” that we estimate subsequently, where we find that as 
expenditure at supercenters increases in a given market, the prices at traditional 
supermarkets decrease.  For example, after two Wal-Mart supercenters opened in 
Houston, a nearby Kroger’s sales dropped 10%, the Kroger store reduced worker hours 
by 30%-40%, and it decreased its prices.
10  Presumably this price decrease is caused by 
greater competition.  We would expect this indirect price effect in a model of 
differentiated shopping outlet competition.  For a related problem see Hausman and 
Leonard (2002) which finds an indirect price effect and test for its consistency with a 
Nash-Bertrand model of competition among competing differentiated bath tissue 
products. 
Thus, consumers demonstrate with their expenditure choices that they prefer lower 
priced outlets, and the higher priced supermarket must respond in a competitive manner.  
Consumers benefit both from the “direct price effect” of lower prices at supercenters and 
                                                 
9 A December 2003 study by UBS Investment Research found a price gap of 17.3% to 26.2%, “Price Gap Tightens, 
Competition Looks Hot Hot Hot.”  The previous year UBS found a price gap of 20.8% to 39.1%.  For example for a 
specified identical market basket UBS finds Wal-Mart supercenters to have an average price 19.1% less expensive 
in Tampa and 22.8% less expensive in Las Vegas.  In 2002, Salomon Smith Barney estimated the price gap to be 
between 5% and 25%.  See L. Cartwright, “Empty Baskets, September 12, 2002. 
10 P. Callahan and A. Zimmerman (2003) report on these effects.  The regional head of Kroger’s stated, “Wal-Mart 
made us look at ourselves and reinvent ourselves.”   7
the “indirect price effect” of lower prices at competing outlets due to the entry and 
expansion of supercenters.  We measure the consumer welfare effects of both the direct 
price effect and indirect price effect in our empirical results. 
 
III. A Utility-Consistent Economic Model of Shopping Destination 
Households choose among differentiated shopping outlets by trading off prices 
and other shopping costs with quality and convenience.  While the goods purchased are 
often physically the same, e.g. a 12 ounce box of Cheerios, prices are typically lower at 
supercenters but the service quality may be lower and the checkout lines may be longer.
11  
However, the assumption of a totally offsetting compensating service differential is 
inconsistent with real world market behavior that finds when Wal-Mart opens a store in a 
new geographic market, it rapidly gains share while conventional supermarkets lose 
share.
12  Some consumers find the choice to be superior while others continue to shop at 
conventional supermarkets.
13  Thus, the arrival of Wal-Mart in a given geographic market 
is similar to the introduction of a new differentiated good into the geographic market.  
The effect on consumers is similar to previous research by Hausman (1997a, 1997b, 
1999) and Hausman and Leonard (2002) since consumers now have increased choice in 
their shopping trip destinations. 
For our economic model we consider the conditional choice of consumers to shop 
at either a conventional supermarket or at a lower price, and perhaps lower service 
quality, supercenter.  For ease of exposition, we use a two-stage choice model in which at 
the lower stage the consumer considers his or her shopping behavior conditional on type 
of store.  The consumer calculates a price index for shopping at either type of store, takes 
account of service and other quality differences, and then at the upper stage decides 
                                                 
11 Personal experiences are often a dangerous guide to market outcomes.  Nevertheless, in my limited experience in 
supermarkets and supercenters I have not found the service better or the checkout lines shorter in supermarkets on 
average. 
12 Supermarket chains sometimes exit a geographic market after Wal-Mart enters.  Albertsons exited the Houston 
market after Wal-Mart entry.  However, in our model we assume that consumers continue to have access to 
traditional supermarkets, even if a given chain exits the market. 
13 As we discussed above, these conventional supermarkets typically decrease price because of the increased 
competition from Wal-Mart.  If the BLS consistently applied its “quality adjustment” procedure it would ignore 
these price decreases at conventional supermarkets because presumably they arise from reduced service quality.  
However, the BLS fully incorporates these price decreases, demonstrating that its approach is based on no correct 
economic assumptions.   8
which type of store to shop at. Because of the stochastic term in the choice decision, 
many consumers can be expected to shop at both types of stores during a period.  We use 
the two-stage approach of Hausman (1985) and Hausman, Leonard and McFadden 
(1995), although neither of the models was designed precisely for the situation of 
shopping destination choice. 
We allow for consumers choice of shopping at either a conventional supermarket, 
j=1, or at a supercenter, j=2.  Conditional on choosing to shop at one of these two types of 
stores the consumer has a conditional expenditure function 
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where the indirect utility function v(p,y) is derived from the duality relationship with the 
expenditure function.  Using duality corresponding to any level of utility in equation (3.1) 
and any vector of prices, a price index exists that corresponds to the minimum 
expenditure required to achieve a given level of utility u .  Indeed, the utility consistent 
price index is the level of expenditure needed to achieve the utility level: 
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14 As written, equation (3.1) assumes that both types of stores carry all goods.  To the extent that supermarkets carry 
a wider variety of products that supercenters, the prices for supercenters can be entered as virtual prices that set 
demand to zero.  See Hausman (1997) for an explanation of virtual prices.   9
An “average price” 
j p can then be calculated by dividing 
j y  by a quantity index 
j x  so 
that  .
j j j x p y =
15 
     We now move to the top level where the consumer decides whether to shop at the 
conventional supermarket or at the supercenter outlet.  We expect 
2 1 y y >  because most 
prices in supermarkets exceed the prices in supercenters.  Consider the use of a binomial 
choice model for choice between traditional supermarkets and supercenters.
16  We specify 
the model with a household fixed effect that controls for household characteristics.  The 
probability of household i in choosing the traditional supermarket is: 
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where  i α  is the household fixed effect, Xij are the attributes of choice j for household i, 
and  ij ε  are the stochastic disturbances.  Letting the stochastic disturbances be extreme 
value, we derive the binomial logit model with fixed effects used by Andersen (1973) and 
Cox (1978): 
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where a log price index or other type of price index (e.g. a Stone price index) can also be 
used depending on the precise form of the underlying expenditure (utility) and demand 
functions in equation (3.1) and (3.2).
17   
 
IV. Data Description 
This study uses a customized subset of the ACNielsen Homescan scanner panel 
data for the four years 1998-2001.  The ACNielsen Homescan data is a consumer panel 
                                                 
15 Instead of the average price we can also divide expenditure by utility to get a “cost of utils” index. 
16 Because of only two choices, the independence of irrelevant alternative assumption does not create a problem 
here.  With more than two choices a nested logit or multinomial probit model could be used.  See Hausman et. al. 
(1995) for a derivation with the nested logit model.   10
consisting of approximately 61,500 randomly selected households across the U.S. and 
includes purchase as well as demographic information for all households in the sample.  
Homescan households are randomly recruited to join the panel using sampling techniques 
to ensure household representation for demographic variables such as household income, 
family composition, education, and household location. Each household is equipped with 
an electronic home-scanning unit, and household members record every UPC-coded food 
purchase they make by scanning in the UPC of the food products that they buy from all 
retail outlets that sell food for home consumption.  
The panel is recruited on a permanent basis, subject to turnover from normal 
attrition or adjustments to demographic targets necessitated by Census revisions.
18  The 
Homescan panel is considered by many in the food industry as the most reliable 
household based panel data due to its long-standing reputation in the marketplace and its 
utilization of hand-held technology that minimizes the recording burden for participants.  
The ACNielsen Homescan consumer panel collects consumer shopping and purchase 
data from all outlet channels, including grocery, drug, mass and convenience stores.  The 
panel is geographically dispersed and is demographically balanced so the sample profile 
matches the US population as closely as possible.  The panel data is also projected to 
census estimates that are updated regularly to reflect population changes.   
Household panel data allows for observation of the ongoing purchase habits and 
practices of household and demographic groups.  Tracking and analyzing this 
information over time can reveal the dynamics of consumer behavior such as who is 
buying what products, what different products are purchased during a given shopping 
trip, and how often a product is purchased.  Panel data quantifies the composition of 
category or brand volume which can be used to measure the impact of store choice on the 
purchase level of product quantities and prices.  Data are collected after each panelist 
shopping trip.  Members of the panel record their purchases, capturing not only what is 
purchased, but also where the purchase was made, and whether the purchase was a 
promotional, sale, or coupon item.   
                                                                                                                                                             
17 An exact aggregation approach when using a Gorman generalized polar form appears in Hausman et. al. (1995). 
18 Households lost through attrition are replaced with others having similar key characteristics.   11
These data are useful in price analysis since we are able to observe actual 
purchase choices by consumers.  However, in terms of food purchase behavior, the key 
missing information is consumer purchases of food away from home (primarily 
restaurant meals) so one needs to assume that the unknown levels of food away from 
home purchases do not somehow bias the average prices paid by an individual household 
for their food at home purchases.  Once this assumption is made these data are useful for 
analysis of the impact of store choice on average prices paid for food at home items.  
Consumer panel information can be used to measure the average prices paid by a 
representative group of households over time.  This measurement of average price paid 
can be aggregated across households and/or across time to measure price change for 
different categories of products.  
Along with the description of each product, the price and quantity that was 
purchased is recorded on a daily basis.  National and regional level aggregates can be 
calculated using transaction data from households located in 50 local U.S. markets as 
well as households in non-metro/rural areas that are included in this data set. For 21 of 
these 50 markets, a large enough number of panelists are included to enable comparisons 
across markets for all UPC-coded products.
 19 
The Economic Research Service (ERS) of the USDA purchased a sub-sample of 
transaction level data from the Fresh Foods Homescan Panel
20 comprised of households 
that not only recorded their UPC-coded transactions, but also recorded their random-
weight (non-UPC coded) food purchases over the year(s) that they participated in the 
panel.  This sub-sample is used for this study in order to be able measure the entire 
market basket of household purchases of food for at-home consumption
21.  Of this group 
                                                 
19 Albany, Atlanta, Baltimore, Birmingham, Boston, Buffalo-Rochester, Charlotte, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, 
Columbus, Dallas, Denver, Des Moines, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Hartford-New Haven, Houston, Indianapolis, 
Jacksonville, Kansas City, Little Rock, Los Angeles, Louisville, Memphis, Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, 
Nashville, New Orleans-Mobile, New York, Oklahoma City-Tulsa, Omaha, Orlando, Philadelphia, Phoenix, 
Pittsburgh, Portland, Raleigh-Durham, Richmond, Sacramento, Salt Lake City, San Antonio, San Diego, San 
Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, Syracuse, Tampa, Washington, D.C. 
20 The Fresh Foods Homescan Panel contained 12,000 households in 1998 and 1999 and was expanded to 15,000 
households in 2000 and 2001.  
21 If only UPC-coded products were used to measure food-at-home expenditures, many fruit, vegetable, meat, and 
poultry purchases would not be recorded in the data and food-at-home expenditure shares by store type would not 
accurately measure true household and market expenditure shares.  This is especially true in this situation when 
alternative channel stores sell less random weight items than conventional retailers.  Leaving out random weight 
items would then tend to overstate the shares of food expenditures of alternative retail outlets.   12
of 15,000 households per year, the sample was restricted to households that participated 
in the panel for at least 10 out of 12 months per year
22.   
Standard demographic information is collected on an annual basis from each 
household and each household’s home market/city and census region is identified for 
stratification purposes (see below).  Each household is then assigned a projection factor 
(weight) based on its demographics in order to aggregate the data to be representative at 
the market, regional, and national level.
 23  
These data were constructed based on a stratified random sample with households 
as the primary sampling unit. A stratified random sample is used to ensure that the 
sample of households matches Census-based demographic and geographic targets.  One 
function of the design is to allow description of 8 major markets for cross-market 
comparisons.
 24 
The strata for 1998 and 1999 are based on six cities (Atlanta, 
Baltimore/Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and San Antonio) and four 
census regions, East, Central, South, and West, for all other households.   
ACNielsen augmented their stratification scheme in 2000, selecting 2 additional major 
markets (San Antonio and San Francisco), but all other strata remained the same. 
There was no known or intentional clustering in the sample construction. The projection 
factor (weight) reflects the sample design and demographic distribution within the strata. 
   The information that is captured on a transaction level basis includes: date of 
purchase, store name and channel type identifier
25, store department identifier
26, item 
description, brand name, number of units purchased, price paid, 
                                                 
 
22 In total, there were 9,501 unique households in the data with some subset participating each year creating a total 
of 28,996 household by year observations.  In 1998 there were 7,624 households, 7,124 households in 1999, 7,523 
households in 2000, and 8,216 households in 2001.  Some households participated in the panel for more than one 
year.  Of the 9,501 households in the data, 5,247 households participated for all four years, 1,877 households 
participated for three years, and 2,377 households were one year participants. 
 
23 Age, gender, education, occupation, of head(s) of household, number of household members, household income, 
household composition, race, and ethnicity. 
 
24 Atlanta, Baltimore/Washington, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, Philadelphia, San Antonio, San Francisco. 
25 Grocery, Drug, Mass Merchandiser, Supercenter, Club, Convenience, Other (including dollar stores, bakeries, 
military stores, online purchases, health food stores, and vending machines)  
26 Dry Grocery, Dairy, Frozen-Produce-Meat, Random Weight.   13
promotions/sales/coupons used (if any).  For retail stores that ACNielsen tracks with their 
store-level scanner data
27, prices are verified through store-level price and promotion 
checks.   
Warehouse shipment data are used to supplement scanner-generated data 
collected from households or provided to ACNielsen through their store-level scanner 
data. Warehouse shipment data is used to estimate the balance of sales moving through 
other food retailers. This information is Census data (i.e., non-projected, actual shipment 
data) supplied to ACNielsen by wholesale co-operators. 
Some question the quality of household panel data when they try to reconcile it 
with store-level scanner data.  There is the perception that the volumetric data from each 
source should be the same.  However, panel data and store data are not always equal 
because measurement methodologies differ.  Store-level data records millions of 
shopping transactions while panel data records a specific group of shoppers.  In addition, 
panel data only represents household-based purchases, so there are no small businesses or 
other institutional purchases included in the panel.  
Both types of information have their uses, and by combining the two, one can 
quantify the composition of volume, understand the reasons behind consumer behavior 
changes, and measure the impact of store choice on average prices.  Store-level scanning 
data may show that sales were down in a particular store for some group of products in a 
given time period.  Panel data provide insight into whether the lost volume is due to 
fewer buyers or if the existing buyers purchased less at the given store or chain of stores.  
Panel data also provide information on which competitors gained the lost expenditures of 
the store in question. 
 
V.  Effects on Prices 
Our empirical approach first investigates the effect of supercenters, mass 
merchandisers, and club stores, (hereafter SMC) on prices paid by households.  Two 
effects are present.  The overall effect is that as more of these superstores operate in a 
given geographic market, the average prices paid by households will decrease.  Prices for 
                                                 
27 The ACNielsen store-level sample is updated through both replacement of canceled or closed stores and 
Continuous Sample Improvement Program -- when the sample is changed intentionally to ensure that changes in the   14
food categories in superstores are typically 5%-48% less than prices for the same product 
in supermarkets and other conventional retail outlets.  Thus, as a high proportion of 
households buy their food at non-traditional retail outlets, the average price paid in a 
market will decrease. 
 
A.  Price Difference between Supermarkets and Superstores 
In Table 5.1 we calculate the ratios of average prices across different types of 
outlets for 20 food categories.  Column 2 compares the prices for the food categories in 
traditional supermarkets compared to prices for these same categories in SMCs (non-
traditional stores). 
 
Table 5.1: Ratio of Supermarket and Other Outlet Prices to SMC Prices
28 
Product Supermarkets/SMC All  Other/SMC 
Apples 1.546  1.531 
Apple Juice  1.585  1.596 
Bananas 1.384  1.368 
Bread 1.108  1.098 
Butter/Margarine 1.096 1.096 
Cereal 1.172  1.166 
Chicken Breast  1.408  1.411 
Coffee 1.373  1.383 
Cookies 1.223  1.214 
Eggs 1.312  1.305 
Ground Beef  1.372  1.367 
Ham 1.967  1.984 
Ice Cream  1.320  1.331 
Lettuce 2.117  2.107 
Milk 1.207  1.199 
Potatoes 1.412  1.402 
Soda 0.891  0.974 
Tomatoes 1.358  1.321 
Bottled Water  1.058  1.165 
Yogurt 1.413  1.411 
Average 1.300  1.306 
 
The largest difference in average price was for lettuce where SMC prices were about 
50% lower than traditional supermarkets over the 48 month period.  Bottled water was 
                                                                                                                                                             
universe are reflected in the sample. 
28 We consider products that are mainly “branded” products, e.g. apple juice, cereal, cookies, ice cream, and yogurt 
as well as “non-branded” products, e.g. apples, ground beef, lettuce, and tomatoes.  We did not find a significant   15
the lowest price difference with SMC prices about 5% less expensive.  Soda was the only 
item with a lower price in traditional supermarkets than in SMCs.  When we take an 
average across all of the food categories we find that SMCs have prices that are 27% 
lower than traditional supermarkets.  We find this difference to be quite large.
29 
In column 3 of Table 5.1 we compare the price in all non-SMC outlets, including 
traditional supermarkets, to the price of these food categories in superstores.  We find the 
results to be quite similar with the main differences occurring in soda and bottled water.  
We find the same overall results that SMC stores offer significantly lower prices than 
other retail outlets.   
We do not find any indication that SMC stores change (increase) their prices at a 
greater or lower rate than traditional supermarkets and other retail outlets.  However, we 
cannot do the comparison of price changes in equilibrium because as the presence of 
SMC stores increases, traditional retail outlets, and most importantly traditional 
supermarkets, decrease their prices as a competitive response. 
 
B.  Indirect Effects on Prices from Superstores 
Another important effect exists from the expansion of SMC stores.  Their 
increasing presence also increases competition among traditional food retailers.  These 
supermarkets must decrease prices to remain competitive.  The well-publicized strike in 
the Los Angeles area in late 2003 through early 2004 when traditional supermarkets 
wanted to decrease health benefit for their employees demonstrates the effect that 
potential entry of supercenters can have on competition.  We call this SMC effect on 
traditional supermarkets the indirect price effect.  The indirect price effect is consistent 
with a Nash-Bertrand model of differentiated shopping outlet with increased competition 
arising from entry or expansion of SMCs.  Both the overall and indirect price effects lead 
to lower average prices for households. 
To investigate both the overall and indirect effects on average prices, we do an 
econometric analysis using the ACNielsen Homescan data.  These data are particularly 
useful since they provide household data and allow for a stratified random sample of all 
                                                                                                                                                             
difference in the price ratios between the two categories of products. 
29 The estimated difference is in line with stock analyst reports who have previously sampled the difference in prices   16
households.  Importantly they provide both price and quantity data across all stores.  
Since Wal-Mart and some other large superstores no longer participate in the IRI or 
ACNielsen store level data collection, household data collection provide a source of price 
and quantity data that are not available elsewhere. 
We analyze data at the market level using a fixed effects specification with 48 
monthly observations for each market during the period 1998-2001: 
 
48 , 1 34 , 1 = = + + + = t i e p it it t i it ε β δ α    (5.1) 
 
where pit is the average log price paid for a given product,  i α  is a fixed effect for a 
market,  t δ  is a monthly fixed effect, eit is percentage expenditure for a given product in 
superstores, and β is the elasticity coefficient that we estimate.  We use market fixed 
effects rather than random effects because expenditure in SMC stores is unlikely to be 
uncorrelated with the stochastic disturbance, e.g. Hausman (1978).  In this situation a 
fixed effects estimator yields the efficient estimator.  However, we make two further 
econometric adjustments.  First, expenditure in superstores on a given product may well 
not be econometrically pre-determined.  Thus, we use instrumental variable estimation 
(2SLS) where as the instrument we use the overall proportion of food expenditure in 
SMC stores in a given market as the instrumental variable.  Since the left hand side 
variable in equation (5.1) is expenditure on a given product while the instrumental 
variable is expenditure across all products, so that a given product is an extremely low 
percentage of overall expenditure, the instrumental variable should not be correlated with 
the stochastic disturbance, especially after fixed effects are taken into account.  Also, we 
use an autoregressive model for the stochastic disturbance (AR1) to capture the time 
series aspect of the data and to achieve more efficient estimates.  However, least squares 
with robust standard errors leads to quite similar results. 
                                                                                                                                                             
over a very few markets.   17
  For our econometric investigation of 20 food products we use 34 markets
30, each 
with over 12,000 food transactions per year.  For each of these markets we standardized 
purchases on a physical unit measure and estimated the effect of increasing purchases in 
SMC stores.  Since we have fixed effects for each market, persistent cost and price 
differences should be take account of as well as seasonal effects given the presence of 
monthly fixed effects.  We give the econometric estimates for these 20 food categories 
across the 34 markets in Table 5.2: 
 
Table 5.2: Average Price for Food Products across 34 Markets 
National Results   
AR(1) IV Results 
(Asymptotic Standard Errors) 
Product All  Stores 
Apples -0.1036
 (0.2298)


















Ground Beef  -0.0679
                                                 
30 Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo-Rochester, Charlotte, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Denver, 
Des Moines, Detroit, Grand Rapids, Hartford-New Haven, Houston, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Los Angeles, 
Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New York, Omaha, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Pittsburgh, Portland, Salt Lake City, 




















    
All of the estimated elasticity coefficients are negative as expected.  Thus as households 
spend increasing amounts of expenditure at SMCs, the average prices paid for food items 
decrease.  While the effects are estimated with varying amount of precision, overall the 
results are highly significantly different from zero.  No obvious pattern of coefficient size 
seems to exist: we find the largest effects for ham, lettuce, butter/margarine, tomatoes, 
potatoes, and coffee, which are a mix of branded and unbranded products.  Yet, we find 
relatively small effects for ground beef, apples and bananas, which are typically 
unbranded products, but we also find relatively small effects for cereal and yogurt, which 
typically are branded products.   Overall, we find a statistically negative effect on 
average prices as shopping in superstores increases.  Thus, we find the “direct effect” 
operates as household shift their expenditure from traditional supermarkets to lower 
priced superstore outlets. 
  In Graph 5.1 we depict the difference in average prices paid by households due to 
the spread of SMC stores over the period. During the sample period from January 1998 
to December 2001 the expenditure share of SMC stores increased from 10.9% to 16.9%, 
a 55.3% increase over the 48 months or 11.6% per year.  We take the econometric   19
estimates from Table 5.2 and use them to estimate the decrease in average price for each 
food category.  We then average across food categories and plot the results in Graph 5.1, 
which demonstrates the increasing effect on average food prices as SMCs become more 
available and households increase their expenditures at these retail outlets.  We find that 
food prices are 3.0% lower than otherwise, or an effect of about 0.75% year. 
 






















































  We now repeat the econometrics to test for the “indirect effect” of lower 
conventional supermarket prices because of increased competition from superstores.  In 
equation (5.1) we replace the left-hand variable pit, which is the average log price paid 
for a given product, with it p ~ , which is the average price paid in supermarkets and present 
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Table 5.3: Average Price for Food Products in Supermarkets across 34 Markets 
National Results for Supermarkets 
AR(1) IV Results 




































Tomatoes -0.6956  21
 (0.4791)





We estimate 18 of the 20 coefficients to be negative, with the only exceptions being 
bread and cereal, neither of which is statistically significant.
31  As would be expected 
from economic theory, the effects of increased SMC expenditures are smaller for most of 
the products.   Thus, the “overall effect” on average prices paid by household arising 
from substitution to lower priced SMCs typically exceeds the “indirect effect” of 
decreased prices in supermarkets.  Nevertheless, we do find some quite large indirect 
effects as in lettuce, butter/margarine, coffee, ice cream, potatoes, tomatoes, and bottled 
water.  The spread of supercenters leads to lower prices both for households that shift 
their food shopping from supermarket to SMC stores but also for households who 
continue to shop at supermarkets because of lower prices caused by the increased 
competition from expanding food offerings at SMCs. 
  In terms of one of the questions we posed at the beginning of the paper, the spread 
of supercenters does significantly affect prices paid by households.  Holding prices fixed 
as households shift their expenditures to non-traditional retail outlets, we find the average 
prices they pay decrease.  However, prices also change because as households shift their 
purchasing behavior, the increased competition forces supermarkets to lower their prices.  
Both of these effects, the overall effect and indirect effect, lead to lower average prices 
paid by households for food items. 
 
VI.  Effects on Consumer Welfare 
 We now use the binomial choice model of Section III to estimate the changes in 
consumer welfare that arise from the entry and expansion of supercenters.  We use the 
“virtual price approach” of Hausman (1997) and Hausman and Leonard (2002).  The total 
effect on consumers of the introduction of a new shopping outlet, i.e., the compensating 
                                                 
31 We find very similar results if we group the remaining Nielsen categories with supermarket: drug stores, 
convenience, and “other”.  These other outlet categories have relatively low expenditure levels compared to 
traditional supermarkets.   22
variation, can be written as the difference in the consumers’ expenditure function before 
and after the introduction, holding utility constant at the post-introduction level: 
 
   CV =  e( p ,p ,r,u ) - e( p ,p p ,r,u ) 1N 1 0 N 1
* () 0     (6.1) 
 
where  1 p  is the price index of post-introduction prices of the competing shopping 
outlets,  N p  is the post-introduction price of the new supercenter, r is a vector of prices of 
products outside the market (which are assumed to be unaffected by the introduction), 
and u1 is the post-introduction utility level.  The pre-introduction utility level could also 
be used which would yield an equivalent variation measure.  The function  pp N
* () 0  
defines the “virtual” price index for the new outlet, i.e., the reservation price at which 
demand for the new outlet would be zero given the prices of the other products. 









1 N 1N 1
11 NN 10
CV =  e( , ,r,u ) - e( ,p p ,r, )  +  pp p u
e ( , p p, r , )  -  e ( , p p, r , ) pp uu
⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
    (6.2) 
 
and written as CV = VE + IPE.  The first term (“VE”—the “variety effect”) represents 
the increase in consumer welfare due to the availability of the new outlet, holding the 
prices of the existing brands constant at their post-introduction level.   
The second term (“IPE”--the “indirect price effect”) represents the change in 
consumer welfare due to the change in the prices of existing outlets after the introduction.  
By changing the competitive structure of the industry, the new outlet introduction will 
lead to a decrease in the prices at existing outlets.  The more closely the new outlet 
competes with the existing outlets, the greater the downward effect on prices.  Thus, in 
addition to providing additional variety, the introduction of a new outlet can change 
consumer welfare through an effect on the prices of existing outlets.   
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A.  Estimation of the Fixed Effects Logit Model 
We now estimate the fixed effects binomial logit model of equation (3.5).  Given 
that we have multiple monthly observations across households, we can estimate a fixed 
effects model.  We find the fixed effects to be quite important in explaining household 
shopping behavior.  We also find that fixed effects are required or otherwise a random 
effects (or regular) binomial choice model fails a Hausman (1978) specification test 
because unobserved household components are correlated with shopping behavior.  We 
estimate the coefficient of the log of the price index ratio in equation (3.5) to be -0.040 
with an asymptotic standard error of (0.014).  We also include the market ratio of 
supercenter expenditure as another variable (which may be jointly endogenous), but we 
find our estimate of β  to remain nearly the same with an estimate of -0.035 (0.014), 
which is not statistically different from our first estimate.  We find a coefficient of log 
income to be estimated at 0.024 (0.010).
32  Thus, we find both the price index and income 
to significantly effect outlet shopping choice. 
We now use these parameter estimates to estimate the gain in consumer welfare 
from the entry and expansion of Wal-Mart and other non-traditional retail outlets.  
Because food expenditure is a significant amount of total expenditure, about 12%, and we 
find that income plays a role in destination choice we estimate the exact competing 
variation of equations (6.1) and (6.2) using the approach and numerical methods 
developed in Hausman (1981), Hausman and Newey (1995), and Small and Rosen 
(1981). These methods integrate the compensated choice function of equation (3.5), thus 
evaluating the expenditure function, from the current price to the “virtual” price at which 
demand for shopping at supercenters would be zero.   
We estimate the compensating variation for each household for each period and 
each month and aggregate over each market.  Average food expenditure across markets 
and periods is approximately $151 per month.  The average variety affect across market 
and period is substantial at an estimated exact compensating variation 20.2% of food 
expenditure.  Thus consumers benefit from the availability of supercenters.  The effect 
varies significantly across markets and periods as supercenters enter and expand during 
                                                 
32 Note that this coefficient is estimated from changes in household income over the sample period.  It may suffer 
from an errors in variables problem because it is self-reported. For a further discussion of errors in variables in panel   24
our sample period: the minimum estimated compensating variation from the variety effect 
is estimated to be 9.6% of household expenditure on food and the maximum 
compensating variation is estimated to be 32.7% of household expenditure on food. 
We now estimate the exact compensating variation from the indirect price effect.  
Note that this estimate will be less than the amount that traditional outlets decrease their 
prices when supercenters enter or expand in a market, because only savings on actual 
expenditures are estimated.  We estimate the average exact compensating variation from 
the indirect price effect to be 4.8% of food expenditure across markets and time periods.   
Again we find significant variation across markets and across time with the range of our 
estimates 1.3% to 7.3%. 
We now add the two sets of estimates together using equations (6.1) and (6.2) and 
the fact that our approach uses integrable estimates of compensating variation since we 
have used the compensated demand functions.  We find the overall average increase in 
the ratio of exact compensating variation to overall food expenditure to be 25.0%.  
Considering the minimum and maximum estimates over markets and time periods we find 











Thus, we find a substantial and significant effect of increased compensating variation for 
households who have the choice to shop at supercenters.  A direct effect arises from the 
lower prices at supercenters and an indirect effect arises from the competitive effect on 
                                                                                                                                                             
data see Griliches and Hausman (1986). 
Table 6.1: Exact Percentage Compensating Variation Estimates   
           
   Average  Minimum    Maximum
           
Variety Effect  20.2%    9.6%    32.7% 
            
Indirect Price 
Effect 4.8%    1.3%    7.3% 
            
Total Effect  25.0%    14.9%    36.6%   25
traditional food outlets.  Our estimates take account of price and service differentials 
across stores as well as household attributes. 
We consider the distributional effects of our compensating variation estimates.  
The ACNielsen Homescan data groups the income response into categories and in Graph 
6.1 we plot the compensating variation in terms of these categories: 
 

































Note that the compensation variation differs by income category.  For household 
income below $10,000 we estimate compensation variation in the range of 29% of 
household food expenditure.  Thus, these less well-off households benefit greatly by 
shopping at supercenters.  Indeed, they benefit by approximately 50% more than the 
average effect we estimate in Table 6.1.  As income increases we estimate decreased 
proportions of compensating variation as a percentage of food expenditure.  Thus, we 
conclude that less well-off households benefit the most by the spread of supercenters.
33 
                                                 
33 While we do not explore the issue, since less well-off households have a higher marginal utility of income the 
benefit to these households would be even greater than our estimates find if this factor were taken into account.   26
We further explore demographic effects by using weighted least squares to 
estimate a model where the estimate of household compensating variation is regressed on 
demographic factors.  The results are given in Table 6.2: 
 
Table 6.2  Coefficient. Std. Error  t statistic 
      
Log Income  -0.0132  0.0063  -2.0993 
Household size  -0.0309  0.0036  -8.6515 
married -0.0387  0.0148  -2.6225 
kids -0.0369  0.0096  -3.8457 
nonwhite 0.0595  0.0080  7.4042 
male employed  -0.0256  0.0102  -2.5199 
female employed  -0.0004  0.0075  -0.0555 
male head  -0.0322  0.0166  -1.9419 
female head   0.1222  0.0184  -6.6341 
male high school  0.0004  0.0089  0.0443 
female high school  -0.0198  0.0080  -2.4768 
constant 0.7286  0.0638  11.4284 
      
Number of obs  10086    
F( 11, 10074)  89.23    
R-squared 0.0888    
Root MSE  0.317    
 
As we found in Graph 6.1, lower household income has a significant effect on estimated 
household compensating variation.  Minorities also gain a significantly higher amount of 
consumer surplus.  Education level does not have a significant effect on compensating 
variation.  The spread of supercenters has the greatest impact on poorer households and 
minority households.  Thus, the spread of supercenters has favorable distribution effects 
across the population. 
 
B.  Estimation of an Individual Household Logit Model 
Our estimates above arise from a fixed effects logit model where the elasticities 
differ across households in part because we allow for an individual household effect.  We 
find these individual household effects to be quite important in explaining household 
shopping behavior.  Consequently, they also have an important effect on the estimates of 
compensating variation.  In estimating the fixed effects model we account for the   27
“incidental parameters” problem that arises as the number of households becomes large 
relative to the number of time periods. 
 Since we have 48 monthly observations for most households, we return to the 
estimation of equation (3.5) and explore estimation with both a separate household fixed 
effect and a separate slope coefficient for each household.
34  Thus, we estimate an 
individual set of parameters  } , { 1i i β α for each household.  Whether 48 observations are 
sufficient to obtain reasonable results is an empirical question, given the non-linear form 
of equation (3.5).
35  We explored estimation of a “log-odds” model of the Berkson-Theil 
form for each household where the log (pit/(1-pit)) is regressed on a household constant 
and the difference in (log) prices from equation (3.5).  The model specification becomes 
linear after the transformation of the left-hand side variable.  We found similar results so 
that our inference is that 48 observations may be enough to estimate individual household 
parameters in this situation. 
We now explore how these estimates differ from the fixed effects logit model 
with a common slope parameter across households but different household fixed effects.
36  
We now find an average surplus proportion of expenditure from the variety effect of 
17.0% compared to our earlier estimate of 20.2% in Table 6.1.  If we symmetrically trim 
the estimates using a 5% trimming factor we estimate the average variety effect to be 
17.3%; with a 10% trimming factor we estimate the average variety effect to be 17.7%.  
Thus, we find somewhat smaller estimates of the compensating variation when we allow 
for a model with different household parameters both for the fixed effect and for the slope 
parameter.  When we include the indirect price effect of Table 6.1 we find compensating 
variation exceeding 21% of overall food expenditure, which remain a quite significant 
amount. 
Estimating separate slope coefficients leads to a significant amount of variation in 
the estimated coefficients.  Indeed, approximately 6% of the coefficients are estimated to 
                                                 
34 For some households we have fewer than 48 observations.  Our results are not sensitive to inclusion of these 
households. 
35 Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman (1981) estimated individual parameter models in a logit context for ordered choice 
data. 
36 We base these results only on household with negative estimates of  i 1 β .  We found about 5.6% of the estimated 
parameters were significant and positive.   28
be non-negative, which violates economic theory and does not allow for estimation of 
compensating variation.  We thus consider using penalized least squares where we shrink 
the individual household coefficient toward the overall coefficient estimate we estimated 
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where  it x ~  is the deviation from the household mean, λ  is the penalty parameter, and β
)
 is 
the fixed effect estimate of  -0.0403 from the last section.
37  Rather than attempting to 
choose an “optimal” value of λ using a statistical criterion such as cross-validation, we 
provide the estimates of the average  i β  and the average compensating variation for 
various values of λ in Table 6.3: 
 
  Table 6.3: Penalized LS Estimation of β  and λ   
λ   Ave β Ave  CV 
   
0.2 -0.0496 0.153 
0.5 -0.0444 0.238 
1 -0.0421  0.285 
2 -0.0409  0.401 
5 -0.0405  0.360 
100 -0.0403 0.224 
 
Interestingly, we do not find the compensating variation estimates to be monotonic inλ .  
They initially decrease and then begin to increase reaching a maximum of approximately 
0.41.  They then decrease monotonically until they become essentially equal to the 
compensating variation estimate we found using the fixed effects model we estimated 
above.  The results do lead us to conclude that a significant increase in compensating 
variation arises from the spread of supercenters. 
                                                 
37 For a discussion of penalized least squares, see e.g. G. Robinson (1991) and R. Beran (2001).  Interestingly, 
Robinson fails to recognize the need for fixed effects when right hand variables are not orthogonal to the individual 
effects as Hausman (1978) and Hausman-Taylor (1981) discuss.   29
VII. Conclusion 
Over the past 15 years the largest development in food retailing has been the 
introduction of Wal-Mart supercenters that compete most closely with traditional 
supermarkets.  Wal-Mart has expanded greatly, mostly in the South and Southwest, and 
become the largest supermarket chain in the U.S.  Wal-Mart is now expanding into 
additional geographic markets in California and the upper Midwest, so its effects will 
become even more important.
38   Wal-Mart offers many identical food items at an average 
price about 15%-25% lower than traditional supermarkets.  Wal-Mart’s entry into a new 
geographic market creates a direct price effect by offering a lower price option to 
consumers and an indirect price effect by causing traditional supermarkets to lower their 
prices because of the increased competition.  This paper estimates the effect on consumer 
welfare of the entry and expansion of Wal-Mart and other supercenters into geographic 
markets. 
 We find that an appropriate approach to the analysis is to let the choice to shop at 
Wal-Mart be considered as a “new good” to consumers when Wal-Mart enters a 
geographic market.  Some consumers continue to shop at traditional supermarkets while 
other consumers choose to shop at Wal-Mart.  Many consumers shop at both types of 
stores. Thus, we specify a utility consistent two level model of choice among types of 
shopping destinations.  We then estimate a fixed effects binomial logit choice model to 
estimate the parameters of the utility model that differs across households.   We use the 
estimated parameters to calculate the exact compensating variation that arises from the 
direct variety effect of the entry and expansion of supercenters and find the average 
estimate to be 20.2% of average food expenditure.  We similarly estimate the exact 
compensating variation from the indirect price effect that arises from the increased 
competition that supercenters create.  We find this average effect to be 4.8%.  Thus, we 
estimate the average effect of the total the compensating variation to be 25% of food 
expenditure, a sizeable estimate.   
Since we find that lower income households tend to shop more at these low priced 
outlets and their compensating variation is higher from supercenters than higher income 
households, a significant decrease in consumer surplus arises from zoning regulations 
                                                 
38 Wal-Mart has announced plans to open 40 supercenters in California in the next 3-5 years, Wiltamuth op. cit.   30
and pressure group tactics that restrict the entry and expansion of supercenters into 
particular geographic markets.   31
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